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Re´sume´
In this proposal for the Journe`es Codes et Ste´ganographie 2012, we
define a new rigorous approach for steganalysis based on the complexity
theory. It is similar to the definitions of security that can be found for
hash functions, PRNG, and so on. We propose here a notion of secure
hiding and we give a first secure hiding scheme.
1 Introduction
Robustness and security are two major concerns in information hiding. These
two concerns have been defined in [6] as follows. “Robust watermarking is a
mechanism to create a communication channel that is multiplexed into original
content [...]. It is required that, firstly, the perceptual degradation of the marked
content [...] is minimal and, secondly, that the capacity of the watermark channel
degrades as a smooth function of the degradation of the marked content. [...].
Watermarking security refers to the inability by unauthorized users to have
access to the raw watermarking channel. [...] to remove, detect and estimate,
write or modify the raw watermarking bits.”
In the framework of watermarking and steganography, security has seen seve-
ral important developments since the last decade [1, 4, 7]. The first fundamental
work in security was made by Cachin in the context of steganography [2]. Ca-
chin interprets the attempts of an attacker to distinguish between an innocent
image and a stego-content as a hypothesis testing problem. In this document,
the basic properties of a stegosystem are defined using the notions of entropy,
mutual information, and relative entropy. Mittelholzer, inspired by the work of
Cachin, proposed the first theoretical framework for analyzing the security of a
watermarking scheme [8].
These efforts to bring a theoretical framework for security in steganogra-
phy and watermarking have been followed up by Kalker, who tries to clarify
the concepts (robustness vs. security), and the classifications of watermarking
attacks [6]. This work has been deepened by Furon et al., who have translated
Kerckhoffs’ principle (Alice and Bob shall only rely on some previously shared
secret for privacy), from cryptography to data hiding [5]. They used Diffie and
Hellman methodology, and Shannon’s cryptographic framework [10], to classify
the watermarking attacks into categories, according to the type of information
Eve has access to [4, 9], namely : Watermarked Only Attack (WOA), Known
∗Authors in alphabetic order
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Message Attack (KMA), Known Original Attack (KOA), and Constant-Message
Attack (CMA). Levels of security have been recently defined in these setups. The
highest level of security in WOA is called stego-security [3], recalled below.
In the prisoner problem of Simmons [11], Alice and Bob are in jail, and
they want to, possibly, devise an escape plan by exchanging hidden messages
in innocent-looking cover contents. These messages are to be conveyed to one
another by a common warden, Eve, who over-drops all contents and can choose
to interrupt the communication if they appear to be stego-contents. The stego-
security, defined in this framework, is the highest security level in WOA setup [3].
To recall it, we need the following notations :
– K is the set of embedding keys,
– p(X) is the probabilistic model of N0 initial host contents,
– p(Y |K1) is the probabilistic model of N0 watermarked contents.
Furthermore, it is supposed in this context that each host content has been
watermarked with the same secret key K1 and the same embedding function e.
It is now possible to define the notion of stego-security :
Definition 1 (Stego-Security) The embedding function e is stego-secure if
and only if :
∀K1 ∈ K, p(Y |K1) = p(X).
2 Toward a Cryptographically Secure Hiding
2.1 Introduction
Almost all branches in cryptology have a complexity approach for security.
For instance, in a cryptographic context, a pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG) is a deterministic algorithm G transforming strings into strings and
such that, for any seed k of length k, G(k) (the output of G on the input k) has
size ℓG(k) with ℓG(k) > k. The notion of secure PRNGs can now be defined as
follows.
Definition 2 A cryptographic PRNG G is secure if for any probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm D, for any positive polynomial p, and for all sufficiently
large k’s,
|Pr[D(G(Uk)) = 1]− Pr[D(UℓG(k)) = 1]| <
1
p(k)
,
where Ur is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}
r and the probabilities are taken
over UN , UℓG(N) as well as over the internal coin tosses of D.
Intuitively, it means that no polynomial-time algorithm can make a distinc-
tion, with a non-negligible probability, between a truly random generator and
G.
Inspired by these kind of definitions, we propose what follows.
2.2 Definition of a stegosystem
Definition 3 (Stegosystem) Let A an alphabet and S,M,K three sets of
words on A called respectively the sets of supports, messages, and keys.
A stegosystem on (S,M,K) is a tuple (I, E , inv) such that :
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– I : S ×M×K −→ S, (s,m, k) 7−→ I(s,m, k) = s′,
– E : S × K −→M, (s, k) 7−→ E(s, k) = m′.
– inv : K −→ K, s.t. ∀k ∈ K, ∀(s,m) ∈ S ×M, E(I(s,m, k), inv(k)) = m.
– I(s,m, k) and E(c, k′) can be computed in polynomial time.
I is called the insertion function, E the extraction function, s the host content,
m the hidden message, k the embedding key, k′ = inv(k) the extraction key,
and s′ is the stego-content. If ∀k ∈ K, k = inv(k), the stegosystem is symmetric,
otherwise it is asymmetric.
Definition 4 (Bounded stegosystem) Let f : N→ N. A stegosystem (I, E , inv)
of (S,M,K) is f−bounded if dom(I) ⊆
⋃
n∈N
An × Af(n) ×K.
Definition 5 (Probability set) A probability set X = {(Sn, Pn), n ∈ N} on
A is an infinite family of couples of finite sets Sn ⊆ A
∗ together with their
probability distributions Pn, such that for every n ∈ N, there exists r ∈ N such
that each element of Sn is in A
r. The integer r is denoted ℓ(Sn). Moreover it is
required that ℓ(Sn) is bounded by a polynomial in n.
2.3 Cryptographically secure hiding
Definition 6 (Secure hiding) Let f : N −→ N, (I, E , inv) a stegosystem
of (S,M,K), and X = {(Sn, Pn), n ∈ N} a probability set. I is a f−secure
hiding for X if it is f−bounded and if for every positive polynome p, for any
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D, for any k ∈ K, for all sufficiently
large i’s, for all m ∈ Af(ℓ(Si)),
|Pr (D (I(Si,m, k)) = 1)− Pr (D (Si) = 1)| <
1
p(i)
+
1
p(k)
(1)
where the probabilities are taken over the distribution X as well as over the coin
tosses of D and where ε(k)→ 0 when the size of k grows up.
Intuitively, it means that there is no polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm
being able to distinguish the host contents from the stego-contents
Proposition 1 If f1 ≤ f2 one can compute from any f2−secure hiding stego-
system for X a f2−secure hiding stegosystem for X .
Example 1 Assume that A = {0, 1}, and that
– there exists α ∈ N such that for every n, |Sn| = 2
ℓ(Sn)−α and,
– for each n, there exists sn ∈ {0, 1}
∗ such that Sn = {sn · w | w ∈
{0, 1}ℓ(Sn)−α, where · is the concatenation product and,
– for each n, each s ∈ Sn, Pn(s) = 1/|Sn|.
Let G be a cryptographic PRNG. We consider that I(s,m, k) is defined for
s ∈ Sn and m ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(Sn)−α, for k such that the length of G(k) is ℓ(Sn) − α,
by I(s,m, k) = sn · (m ⊕ G(k)). Let f0 be the function mapping n into n/α.
The symetric stegosystem defined by I and where E(snw, k) = w ⊕ G(k) is a
f0−secure hiding stegosystem for X .
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3 Conclusion
We thus intend to propose to these Journe`es Codes et Ste´ganographie 2012
this new rigorous approach for steganalysis based on the complexity theory.
It is inspired by the definitions of security that can usually be found in other
branches of cryptology. We have proposed a notion of secure hiding and presen-
ted a first secure hiding scheme. Our intention is to prove this result during the
presentation, and to give further developments, by adapting such a notion to
define using complexity what is a robust watermarking, and what is a message
that cannot be extracted.
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